EBUS602 Strategic Operations Management Assignment 1 – AU

Subject Code & Title :- EBUS602 Strategic Operations Management
Assessment Type :- Assignment 1
Part 1- Apply Slack and Lewis (S/L) Operations Strategy (OS) framework and Matrix to a real world company of your choice.The following structure is recommended.
1.Introduce the organisation
2. Identify the market side of the OS and the Performance Priorities
3. Identify the resources aspects of the firm and the Decisions made for the key Areas
4. Use the S/L Matrix to map the OS of the firm.
5. Examine and discuss how the firm is leading its OS;
o which aspect is currently predominant in the model the firm is running its operations (Market or Resources)? Briefly explain.
6. Evaluate the balance the firm has in reconciliation between the two dimensions (Market Vs Resources)?
o Identify the risks involved in the current strategy.
EBUS602 Strategic Operations Management Assignment 1 – AU

Part 2- Case Study : Case Norrkopin Plant. Review the attached case and:
a. Discuss how the performance objectives of Norrkopin have changed from the initial market entry to the current time and what reasons for these changes were there?
b. Using slacks matrix for operations strategy, discuss how Norrkopin has changed their operation strategies over the years with respect to two from the following:

• capacity
• technology/process development,
• supply network

This assignment will contribute 60% of the final module mark.

Note: make sure that you appropriately cite any literature and additional material used to support your analysis For detail information regarding report structure citation and plagiarism please refer to the schools PG handbook

Hand-in requirements
An electronic version of report to be submitted via Turnitinuk link on Canvas.

EBUS602 Strategic Operations Management Assignment 1 – AU

Introduction :-
At the Vanden Corporate Park, just outside Norr köping in Sweden is one of the largest pieces of converting machinery with in the Carlsen group. Inside a room which is 20 metres wide and 120 metres long is housed a coater over 80 metres long with around 100 metres of film forming a web path from the unwind through the coating processes and oven, to the rewinder. In June of 2001 when the coater went online for the first time it was, according to Lars Olafsen Vice President of Carlsen’s Industrial Division at the time:

‘…the most advanced machine of its type in the world which will enable us not only to increase manufacturing capacity but also achieve new standards of manufacturing excellence for products requiring absolute cleanliness and precision in production.’

The Norrköping plant was joining what are now Carlsen’s two existing European plants, one in Stockholm and the other outside Copenhagen in Denmark. Both plants offered precision custom coating and laminating services to a wide range of customers.

One of the most important of these customers Agsten used the firm to process its dry photoresist imaging films a critical step in making printed circuit boards.

The Norrköping plant was developed especially to serve this photoresist market though it was always seen by the company as more than simply providing capacity for a growing market. Rather it was seen as a quantum leap in harnessing economies of scale new technology and new forms of organisation to provide the plant of the twenty-first century.

EBUS602 Strategic Operations Management Assignment 1 – AU

Yet the plant’s origins lay some seven years earlier in 1994.

For Carlsen’s photoresist imaging business 1994 was a traumatic year. Prior to that time it had been the clear market leader based on high quality, a cost base comparable with its chief competitors and what it regarded as excellent working relationships with its customers. So when the downturn came the shock was severe. Saviste Graphics the company’s major competitor had introduced a new coating technology early in 1994 which enabled it to produce coated product at levels of cleanliness significantly in excess of those being achieved by Carlsen, who lost business as a result.

Birgit Deprez Operations Vice President Carlsen outlined the situation: We paid out a fortune in customer rejections and the coating machine was down for eight months. Imagine it we just didn’t make any of this product line for eight months!

It was a very painful experience for all of us who were with the company during that period. I guess it was this period which marked a clear turning point in the way Carlsen did business. Up to that time we had acted as though we pretty well knew what we were doing. We found out then that there was another guy on the street who could do things a little better than we could. It was a rude awakening for us. We learnt that if we were going to be successful in this business we always needed to be striving to be a little better. We had never been number two in any marketplace before and we weren’t interested in being number two for very long.’

EBUS602 Strategic Operations Management Assignment 1 – AU

By working on its quality and clean room standards modifying its own coating technology and by reorganising into business teams the company over came the worst of its problems and by August of 1995 was achieving sound business results.

Yet the experience had convinced management that they should be considering more radical ways of deploying their process technology. Also at that time it was judged likely that extra capacity would shortly be needed so this seemed the ideal opportunity to explore some new ideas.

A team led by Birgit Deprez, was formed to create a concept for a coating machine the like of which had not been seen in the industry up to that point The idea was to push the boundaries of process technology further than any one had previously considered doing This technology was to be at the fore front of sophistication with a large capacity faster speed and with state of the art instrumentation and automation together with ultra clean conditions which would make it highly efficient with labour and capable of very high quality levels Gregor Boisot Engineering Manager

EBUS602 Strategic Operations Management Assignment 1 – AU

Carlsen said:
The concept of what became the Norrköping plant goes back to this time. Not only was this machine to have larger capacity higher speed and more computerisation than ever before but also it would have significantly lower costs. We called this machine The Monster. It was a kind of design exercise I guess but with a very serious intent. It was a mind-expanding experience yet with a clear business goal.

However shortly after the creation of the Monster concept the need for this extra capacity evaporated as total market forecasts were revised downwards but all who had participated in the Monster team were convinced of the value of the process. Gregor Boisot explained:

It was the ideas which were conceived at this time that allowed us to move ahead so effectively later. During the time of incubation which followed the exercise, many of the ideas that we had put into the Monster were changed and modified as new technology became available and as our ideas developed. But the Monster had planted the seed so the effort that we put in, although aborted at the time did lead us to be able to be more effective when we got to the point of doing it in reality.’

EBUS602 Strategic Operations Management Assignment 1 – AU

The Monster resurrected
By 1997 forecasts of demand once again indicated a need for extra coating capacity and work started on examining how this extra capacity might be provided. At this The Norrköping Plant (A) time the working assumption was that any new capacity would be similar to the technology which was currently used at the company’s Stockholm operation.

In December of that year David Leopard Carlsen’s CEO visited Agsten the company’s most important customer for photoresist product and became convinced that there was considerable business potential for Carlsen, especially if it could provide the most advanced coating service in the industry. From that point the scope of the capacity project expanded. Carlsen’s operations team was charged with creating an operation which could ensure a competitive advantage and adequate capacity for decades to come. If successful, such an operation held out the prospect of securing a very large part of Agsten’s future business – perhaps even an exclusive agreement to supply 100 per cent of its needs.

After consideration, three options were presented to the firm’s new owners.

A. Expand the Stockholm site by building a new machine within existing site boundaries. This would provide around 12 to 13 million square metres (MSM) per year of additional capacity and require
some what less than Kr100 million in capital expenditure.

B. Build a new facility alongside the Stockholm plant. This new facility could accommodate additional capacity of around 15 MSM per year but unlike option A would also allow for future expansion. Initially this would require around Kr120 million capital.

C. Set up a totally new site with a much larger increment of capacity probably around 25 MSM per
year. This option could also incorporate much of the Monster ultra-clean technology which had been explored two years previously. Clearly this option would be much more expensive almost certainly in excess of Kr 120 million.

The three options represented an increased degree of risk but also an increased potential for profit able business. Birgit Deprez and his team initially favoured option B but in discussion with senior management opinion shifted towards the more radical option C. As he commented:

It may have been the highest risk option but it held considerable potential and it fitted with the company emerging philosophy of getting into high-tech specialised areas of business. The option of a very large ultra clean state-of-the-art facility also had a further advantage it could change the economics of the photo resist imaging industry. An examination of the worldwide demand and capacity at the time did not immediately justify investing in as large an increase in capacity as option C would provide. In fact there was probably some overcapacity in the industry.The real attraction of the ‘Monster’ type operation was that it would provide a level of quality at such low costs that customers would not be able to ignore it. If there was to be even further overcapacity in the industry it would not be Carlsen’s capacity which would be lying idle.

The option also needed costing – a process which surprisingly did not prove a major problem. Birgit Deprez explained: The process of costing the proposal for a large, state-of-the-art machine did not
take too great an effort because we had gone through much of the analysis two years previously when
we created the Monster concept.

Designing the new plant :-
The early part of 1998 was a hectic time for the team, especially Birgit Deprez, Gregor Boisot and from June Peter Wal berg who joined the team as Plant Manager for the as yet un built plant. Detailed
decisions were needed in three interrelated areas:

• Location – where should the new plant be built?
• Technology – how many and what type of coating machines should be installed?
• Organisation – what shape of organisational structure and philosophy of working would be appropriate for the new plant?

Location :-
A number of factors were important when the team were searching for a suitable location for the new plant. Probably the most significant was that any new site should be close to the company’s head quarters near Stockholm. It also needed to have good communications certainly it should be near good transport links. Further more it also needed to be reasonably close to an airport. Just as important it needed to be in an area from which professionals could be recruited or which would attract professionals because of the ‘quality of life available. Gregor Boisot noted: When we were first considering the possibility of a green-field site we contacted local government representatives in several places. Interestingly those in Norrköping were much more receptive than the others who did not seem to be as excited at the prospect of the new plant.

Technology choice :-
The design of the process technology itself again required a series of interrelated decisions. These were:
• What should be the final capacity of the process technology?
• How many separate machines should be installed to achieve this level of capacity?
• What type of drying technology to incorporate within the line?
• What kind of feed system should be installed to deliver the coating material to the coating heads?

The team soon found out that the first two decisions were impossible to separate. They considered two options. The first was to install two coating lines, each with around 15 MSM per year. This was a reasonably ambitious option given that the largest machine existing at that time had a capacity of around nine MSM per year.

However this paled beside the second option which was to install a single prototype machine with a capacity of over 25 MSM per year. This was clearly the riskier option and would require more technological development. How ever it would be more effective in its use of capital and potentially would allow very efficient use of labour. Yet in spite of the potential advantages there was some feeling amongst the company’s technical staff that there might be a penalty in terms of the yield achievable from the big machine and more seriously considerable change over losses.

The decision over the drying technology was again a choice between traditional and radical options. A traditional approach to drying was to use relatively low energy levels applied to the material over a long web path drying the material slowly and making for easier control of the drying process. The more radical solution was to subject the material to higher energy levels over a shorter web path. A major advantage of high energy drying was that it required a shorter machine and therefore a smaller plant to house it. However again there were risks in choosing the more radical solution.

Certainly trials which Gregor Boisot and his team were conducting with suppliers seemed to indicate that there might be considerable problems in achieving an acceptable degree of quality with the high-energy solution.

Focus or flexibility?
In the middle of all this decision making it became clear that there was one issue which was underlying all discussions how flexible should the total system be?
Should the team assume that they were designing a plant which would be dedicated exclusively to the manufacture of photoresist imaging film for the foreseeable future and ruthlessly cut out any technological options which would enable them to manufacture beyond that technical brief? Alternatively should they design a more general purpose plant which although capable of and suitable for photoresist imaging film could with relatively little effort be adapted to coat other products in the future? It proved a difficult decision.

The advantages of the more flexible option were obvious, as Peter Walberg commented:

At least it would mean that there was no chance of me being stuck with a plant and no market for it to serve in a couple of years time.

In the end the design of the technology proved to be a mixture of the adventurous and the conservative. As opposed to the two or three smaller machines envisaged in the original plan the team decided to go for a single large machine. However the traditional drying technology was chosen for its robust tried and tested nature. But perhaps most controversial of all the team decided to focus on a relatively non-flexible dedicated design which would realise the economy of scale potential of the large machine. Peter Walberg commented on the team’s feelings about this decision:

You can’t imagine the agonies we went through when we decided not to make this a flexible machine. Many of us were not comfortable with saying This is going to be a photoresist machine exclusively and if the market goes away we’re in real trouble. We had a lot of debate about that. Eventually we more or less reached a consensus for focus but it was certainly one of the toughest decisions we ever made.

The capital cost savings of adopting a focused facility were attractive, but more influential were the team’s estimates of operating costs savings of up to 25 per cent. Also the philosophy of total process dedication was seen as offering some advantages which could not be directly quantified but were nevertheless important as Gregor Boisot explained:

The key word for us was focus. We wanted to be quite clear about what was needed to satisfy our customer in making this single type of product. As well as providing significant cost savings to us it made it a lot easier to identify the root causes of any problems. In solving any problem we would not have to worry too much about how it might affect other products and other customers. It’s all very clear. When the line was down we would not be generating revenue! The lack of flexibility forced us to understand our own performance. At other plants, if a line goes down the people on the line can be shifted to other responsibilities. We don’t have other responsibilities here–we’re either making it or were not.

Work organisation :-
In the same way that many of the technical ideas which found their way into the Norrköping plant had
their origins some years earlier, so the pattern of work organisation and the concept of self managed
teamwork had been discussed for some time. As Birgit Deprez puts it Norrköping gave us the
opportunity to indulge in self managed work teams and we jumped on the opportunity’. How ever before committing themselves fully the team examined both the opportunities and problems associated with adopting self-managed teams. The key meeting took place in November 1998 and included Birgit Deprez, Peter Walberg and Vernon Vaughan, who had joined the team as Human Resources Manager for the plant. As part of that meeting the team drew up a list of reasons why they should adopt the self-managed work team approach and reasons why they should not do so.

Reasons why we should do it
1 It will allow us to change rapidly.
2 Enriches jobs for all employees.
3 Increased employee ownership.
4 More fulfilling for all employees involved. Leads to pride, high quality, etc.
5 If it leads to high quality it will lead to lower cost.
6 Involves all employees in a joint venture to achieve customer satisfaction.
7 It will attract a higher calibre employee (flexible, thinking).

8 The Pygmalion effect people are or respond to the way you think they are. 9 Our value statement – Let’s walk like we talk regarding the worth and dignity of people quality customers etc.

10.The people we recruit will want change.

Reasons why we should not do it
1 We are currently successful.
2 We are inexperienced in using/implementing such a concept.
3 Starting a new operation – we have plenty going on as it is.
4 We do not have the support of middle management.
5 Risk of failure – ‘It is a big piece of our business’.
6 Increased training costs/employee costs. We might have to pay more to get more.
7 Immediate impact on other Carlsen plants.

8 Uncertain consequences of failure. Would we be better off for having tried and failed or better off not to try?

9 Takes away some (or all) management control.
10 Human beings resist change.

By the end of the meeting the team had reached a number of conclusions. First on balance they were in favour of going ahead with the team approach. Although there were obvious risks involved it was felt that employees expectations and the general values of the times were changing to the extent that a more traditional approach could be equally risky. Second the risk of fore going the advantages of team working and thereby losing competitive edge were too great.

The plant goes up
The operation went online in June 2001, but the task of recruiting the workforce had started months
earlier. Peter Walberg commented:

It took two months to decide on the traits we considered necessary to be successful in the operation.
It went beyond the technical ability of the person it also included the ability to work as a team member with social skills. Over 500 applicants for the positions of production technician were interviewed.

Four hundred passed this initial screening from whom 50 were selected for team interviews that involved four people from the Marketing, Technical and Manufacturing functions. The team interviews whittled the 50 down to 28.

With this number the company started its first pre-employment class that lasted for nine weeks. The training programme consisted of a four day per eek programme with each session lasting four hours. The pre employment class was also intended to test the candidates’ willingness to stretch themselves and their desire to join the company. Peter Walberg explained:

We figured that if a person could manage to work through nine weeks of computer and maths training
while working another job even though we provided no guarantee of employment before the training classes began then this person probably had the staying power that we needed for the company.

Out of the 24 who completed the training programme 19 who excelled in team exercises and interactive skills were selected to join the firm. All 19 accepted.

Looking back
The plant started producing in June 2001. The capacity of the plant at start-up was forecast to reach 33 MSM per year working on a seven-day basis. It was from the start a technical and commercial success. In fact a critical strategic objective had been met in October 2000 when a contract was signed with Agsten whereby 100 per cent of its needs for coated film were to be supplied by Carlsen over the next 10 years with the contract taking full effect in July 2002. By the start of 2001 the plant was already meeting 50 per cent of Agsten’s needs. The process of building up the human assets proved almost totally successful.

Peter Walberg notes:
The teams worked well from the start, partly because we had always stressed the idea that respect is the basis of teamwork. However, you have to recognise that there will be times when the interests of an individual and those of the company will not be identical. This is why it is so important to define very clearly the box with in which the teams are empowered to make decisions.

Birgit Deprez is convinced that the advantages of Norrköping’s team based approach are the foundation of the plant’s success.

Our associates are now well used to the idea that nothing ever stays the same that we have to adapt change and improve no matter how successful we are. They understand business objectives and customer needs as well as any manager. They under stood all this from day one. It was certainly the only time in my career when I saw a work team take over a machine which still had some problems to iron out and yet immediately took responsibility for it themselves.’

The Norrköping Plant- Part B

Introduction :-
In July of 2001 Carlsen Industrial division’s newest largest and most focused plant had started production. The plant represented a calculated gamble that economies of scale and dedicated technology could produce quality and cost performance in coating photoresist imaging film well beyond the capabilities of any competitor. The plant was a totally new building, constructed using ultra-clean principles. Central to the Norrköping investment had been the prize of securing the majority of business from one of the most important companies in the dry film photoresist market Agsten. At the time of the Norrköping start-up, photoresist film produced by Carlsen was shipped to its converting facility in Alborg, Denmark. This distance caused a number of problems. Inevitably there was some waste caused by damage in transit. More seriously, the delays in communication were the cause of some frustration, especially when introducing technical changes to the product or solving minor quality issues. However, notwithstanding the problems of location, the relationship between Carlsen and Agsten was sound, helped by Agsten’s cooperation during the Norrköping project. Peter Walberg, the Norrköping Plant Manager, summed up this relationship:

They had a lot of confidence in us. We had worked closely with them during the design and construction of the new Norrköping facility. More to the point, they saw that they would certainly achieve cost savings from the plant with the promise of more savings to come as the plant moved down the learning curve.

In addition the strategic position of Agsten made close links with Carlsen attractive. Agsten was the only company in the photoresist market without either its own in-house coating capability or integrated coating/converting operations at the same facility. Also the market for dry film photo resist was becoming more competitive due to a growing number of global producers. The resulting margin erosion drove Agsten to investigate a sole source supply agreement with Carlsen. Agreement was reached in late 2000 (during construction of the Norrköping facility) to come into force in July of 2002.

With the agreement Carlsen and Agsten increasingly adopted a partnership philosophy towards the
business. To that end the companies agreed to explore projects that would enhance the partnering provided such projects were favourable for both companies.

EBUS602 Strategic Operations Management Assignment 1 – AU

Co-location :
The idea of a physically closer relationship between Carlsen and Agsten was not new. Conceptually this approach had been considered by Agsten and discussed with Carlsen since the mid-1990s. However Agsten’s dedication to dual sourcing at that time made such an option unattractive. Once a sole source agreement was in place, co-location was seen as producing benefits for both companies. Birgit Deprez, Operations Vice President, Carlsen, commented:

During the negotiations with Agsten for our 100 per cent contract there had been some talk about co-location but I don’t think anyone took it particularly seriously. Nevertheless there was general agreement that it would be a good thing to do. After all, our success as Agsten’s sole supplier of coated photoresist was tied in to their success as a player in the global market. In other words; to a significant degree what was good for Agsten was good for Carlsen.

From late 2000 through to the August of 2001, several options were discussed within and between the two companies. Agsten had in effect to choose between five options:
● Stay where it was in Alborg.
● Locate in southern Sweden but not too close to Carlsen.
● Locate on the adjacent site across the road from the Norrköping plant.
● Co-locate within an extension built to the Carlsen plant at Norrköping.
● Get Carlsen to operate the converting processes for Agsten at the Norrköping facility.

EBUS602 Strategic Operations Management Assignment 1 – AU

The state of the Carlsen–Agsten relationship
A key factor when both companies were evaluating the options for co-location was the closeness of the relationship which had developed between them. This was partly a result of staff from both companies working together in solving the routine issues involved in constructing a large plant such as the Norrköping facility. It was also partly born from adversity. One issue especially had caused delays in commissioning the new facility. In the final stages of installing the new coating line in early 2001 Carlsen’s engineers had hit problems with the machine because of winding difficulties.

EBUS602 Strategic Operations Management Assignment 1 – AU

To solve the problems they designed and installed a new winding mechanism. They also discovered that some problems were caused by bowed paper cores. Moving to more rigid steel cores eliminated these problems. At the same time they tried to find paper or plastic cores that exhibited the straightness of the steel cores. How ever using steel cores was a real issue for Agsten whose staff had to cope with the heavier and cumbersome loads. Carlsen staff were impressed by their customer’s willingness to help out by doing this while they worked on finding suitable lighter cores. The winding problem how ever proved difficult to solve. So as not to cause Agsten problems Carlsen decided to invest in an accumulator mechanism which could be used in the event of the winding problem proving insoluble. The extra cost of The Norrköping Plant (B) 79 purchasing the accumulator was almost Kr 2 million. This time it was Agsten’s turn to be impressed. Carlsen had clearly demonstrated its determination to meet its supply obligations. Peter Walberg commented on the strengthening relationship between the two companies:

The winding problem was potentially very serious. But we made a conscious effort to keep the customer fully informed. In fact they were very helpful in doing anything they could to help us sort the problem. Partly because we worked together on that problem the relationship has grown stronger and stronger. They have become a real part of the partnership rather than someone waiting on the sidelines expecting product to come to them. They agonised when we failed and they shared the sense of achievement when we succeeded. It may be no coincidence that a few months after we worked our way through the winding problem we signed the long-term contract.

EBUS602 Strategic Operations Management Assignment 1 – AU

Evaluating the co-location options
Relatively early in the discussions between the two companies, the two ‘extreme’ options of either doing nothing by staying in Alborg or alternatively Carlsen operating the conversion process themselves at Norrköping were discounted. The advantages of some kind of move both in cost savings and in ease of communications had convinced Agsten that staying in Alborg was too costly. One option for Agsten was to move to a site some 50 km from Norrköping. This would be a relatively cheap option. The building was old and already owned by Agsten’s parent company. Freight costs would be lower than for its current location but communication would be only partially improved.

Agsten also strongly considered building and operating a converting facility across the road from the Norrköping plant This option had several cost related disadvantages to being located in a building attached to the coating plant Yet for a while it was the preferred option Birgit Deprez explained:

There was a lot of resistance to having a customer on the same site as ourselves. At one stage we said we would never do it. No one in Carlsen had ever done it before and we couldn’t imagine working so closely with a customer. The step from imagining our customer across the road to imagining them on the same site took some thinking about. It was a matter of getting used to the idea taking one step at a time. Yet the more the options were discussed, the more it became obvious to both companies that the best plan was to have Carlsen build an addition to Norrköping and lease it to Agsten. One way of achieving this was to make the maximum use of existing space in the Norrköping plant and add only the extra space required. A major justification for the co location project would be its impact on Agsten’s competitiveness by reducing its operating costs. This would enable it to gain market share by offering quality film at attractive prices thus increasing volume for Carlsen. Other advantages for Agsten would come largely in two areas. First there would be significant freight savings associated with the transportation of master rolls when coating and slitting were done at the same location. Second the projected reduction of staffing for Agsten at Norrköping would generate a cost saving.

Carlsen would also derive tangible benefits from this closer operational relationship with the customer. Its ability to work hand in hand with the customer in solving master roll quality issues would reduce rejects through quicker and more accurate feedback. This would also be invaluable in reducing lead time on the introduction of new products or new procedures, while at the same time working together to contain costs and provide increased yields. For example, the possibility of longer rolls and recyclable racking for master rolls were two projects that would clearly benefit from such co-location. Currently both projects were difficult because of having to transport product to the Woburn converting location. Co-location would also give Carlsen added flexibility for coordinating coating and converting schedules to a greater degree thus creating optimal coating efficiency improved raw material utilisation and enhanced quality. Finally co-location would enable Carlsen to bring its staff into daily routine customer contact allowing them to provide improved service and support.

The proposal
By August of 2001 Carlsen’s Norrköping management were in a position to present their proposal for
extending the Norrköping plant to accommodate Agsten.The cost of the facility would be recouped through annual lease payments by Agsten for the 10-year period from 2003. Agsten would relocate
all of its current converting, warehousing and other equipment from its Alborg plant. The proposal
was not well received by the main board of Carlsen. Birgit Deprez recalls:

EBUS602 Strategic Operations Management Assignment 1 – AU

We were beaten up severely at that meeting Providing factory space seemed a long way from our core business. Although we understood that this company is not in the real estate business and expects higher returns than those companies which are, we felt we had a good package and could put together a leasing deal which was profitable in its own right and enhance our ability to make profit in our main business of coating. However money was eventually approved during August of 2001. Nevertheless there was still an element of concern over the arrangement. When the proposal was approved there was still some residual anxiety about the concept of actually sharing a facility.The board insisted for example that the door between the two companies areas should be capable of being locked from both sides. Agsten took occupancy in early 2002 and were slitting sell able product within one week of moving in.

A significant benefit was also gained which had not been forecast. The Norrköping site with Carlsen and the customer working side by side has been used as a model in selling partnerships to new customers. In February 2002 alone meetings were held with two large potential customers in Norrköping so that they could see first hand how strategic partnering and co-locating can work.

And that door separating Carlsen from Agsten which the board insisted be capable of being locked from both sides? It has never even been closed never mind locked said Peter Walberg.